Judicial Selection and Voter Turnout in Jackson County by Basler, Tracey A.
Southern Illinois University Carbondale
OpenSIUC
Honors Theses University Honors Program
5-2000
Judicial Selection and Voter Turnout in Jackson
County
Tracey A. Basler
Southern Illinois University Carbondale
Follow this and additional works at: http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/uhp_theses
This Dissertation/Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the University Honors Program at OpenSIUC. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Honors Theses by an authorized administrator of OpenSIUC. For more information, please contact opensiuc@lib.siu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Basler, Tracey A., "Judicial Selection and Voter Turnout in Jackson County" (2000). Honors Theses. Paper 125.
• 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Introduction I
 
History of Judicial Selection Methods and Their Use 2
 
Current Methods ofJudicial Selection 6
 
Partisan and Nonpartisan Elections 7
 
Gubernatorial Selection 8
 
Legislative Selection 8
 
Merit Selection 9
 
Election vs. Merit Selection 10
 
Illinois .. II
 
•
 
History ofJudicial Selection Methods and Their Use in Illinois 12
 
Analysis of the Election Method ofJudicial Selection 14
 
•
 
Voter Participation in Illinois/Jackson County 16
 
Influencing Factors on Judicial Elections 17
 
External Influencing Factors 17
 
Internal Influencing Factors 22
 
Study ofInfluencing Factors in Jackson County...................................................... 29
 
Study ofExternai Influencing Factors in Jackson County 30
 
External Study Conclusions 41
 
Study ofInternal Influencing Factors in Jackson CoW\(y ........................................... 42
 
Internal Study Conclusions 48
 
Conclusions of Study in Jackson County 48
 
Conclusion . 49
 
•
 
Table One - Method ofJudicial Selection by State 7
 
Table Two - Voting in the 1992 Presidential Election by Age Group 23
 
Table Three - Voting in the 1992 Presidential Election by Education Level.................... 25
 
Table Four - Characteristics of the 105mCongress 29
 
Table Five - Voter Turnout for High Salience Races 32
 
Table Six - Comparing Voter Turnout 33
 
Table Seven - Voter Turnout For High Salience (Presidential) Races 34
 
Table Eight - Partisan Judicial Election Results 36
 
Appendix A - Judicial Retention Elections 52
 
Appendix B - 1990 US Census Data 53
 
Appendix C - Ballot Form 56
 
Bibliography 58

• 
•
 
INTRODUCTION
• The United States Constitution extended powers to the Judiciary branch as the third and final 
branch in its creation of a government. The judiciary has the authority under the Constitution to 
oversee the laws ofthe land and ensure that the other two branches (Executive and Legislative) do 
not create and implement laws that are in conflict with the Constitution or Bill ofRights, which were 
implemented to ensure that the government did not surpass its powers. Therefore, ahhough the 
judiciary also has some built-in checks and balances, it still wields extreme power. The Constitution 
also gives full faith and credit to the laws ofeach state and allows each state to make its own statutes 
in addition to the federal statutes which often leads to many different laws and controlling legislation 
within each state of the country in entirety. Laws may vary greatly from state to state as each state 
defines its own way ofdoing things. This is true ofthe manner of selection ofjudges, the overseers 
• ofthe significant power of the judiciary branch ofeach state's government. 
Each state in the country has evolved in the manner bywhichjudges are selected. This paper 
will examine the history of those selection methods, and identifY the use ofeach of those methods 
across the country today. In addition to an overall discussion ofthe different processes and methods 
ofselecting judges, this paper will also discuss in further detail the history ofthe systems used by the 
state oflllinois, a state that currently chooses to use a method ofselection, partisan election, that has 
been popular countrywide since the early nineteenth century. The method chosen in Illinois has many 
supporters and also much opposition. It was with controversy that Illinois has chosen to adopt this 
method. It has also not been without controversy that Illinois chose to keep this method, a topic this 
paper will also examine in some detail. 
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It may also be important to look at this issue on a more personal, local level in order to try 
to determine if the method chosen actually functions adequately on a tangible basis as well as in 
theory. A convincing indicator ofthe success ofa system based on popular election ought to be the 
participation of the local electorate in the nomination and election ofjudges in their county. To 
accomplish this more in-depth appraisal, this paper will examine the method in a case study focusing 
on one county in Illinois, Jackson County, in the southern part of the state, and will attempt to 
identuy the viability ofthe system at the local level. In order to achieve this, this paper will identuy 
some influencing fuctors at play during an election that may determine the level ofparticipation in a 
judicial election. In order to identuy these influences, the study will analyze statistical data from 
previous judicial elections, media materials, and a previous census. It will attempt to identifY the 
functionality ofthe system in relation to the participation ofthe electorate, and determine ifa system 
• 
that is supposed to be one grounded in democratic theory actually is. 
HISTORY OF JUDICIAL SELECTION METHODS AND THEIR USE 
The method ofJudiciai Selection in each state is determined by the legislation ofthat state and 
is detailed in the respective state Constitution. The methods most commonly ratified and used in 
these constitutions have evolved over history from England and the colonies before the United States, 
through the War ofIndependence and the Civil War. Today, a reform movement is taking place at 
state level which continues the evolution ofthe different selection systems in place in each state, and 
which caUs into question the values ofeach ofthose systems. For numerous years, each system used 
has had critics that attest to the positive factors oftheir favored plan and the negatives ofother plans, 
• -2­
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a situation that continues today.
 
Historically, each state within the United States has employed a variety ofselection methods
 
(Ashman, 1). Methods that were first employed were derived from those used in England and 
extended to the colonies. These systems began to change during an English Revolution in 1688 
against the Stuart kings of England. The revolution led to a number offar-reaching changes in 
England in the distribution of power between the monarch and other branches of government 
(Ashman, 7). The Act of Settlement in 1701 permitted continuation of the previous system which 
allowed the king sole power to appoint and commission judges, but placed two important checks on 
the king. These checks established that the judge's term of office was to be based upon good 
behavior, and that the removal ofa judge was to be only by approval and debate by members ofthe 
House of Commons and the House ofLords, both of England's Houses ofParliarnent. This freed 
• 
judges from the belief that they merely served at the pleasure and prerogative ofthe sovereign, and 
any decisions that they made that were unpopular would lead to their removal from service (Ashman, 
8). Due to these checks, the judiciary in England continued to grow more independent throughout 
the early eighteenth century. This was never more apparent than in 1761 when a statute was passed 
that allowed for the continuation of judicial power upon the death of the appointing monarch 
(Ashman, 8). Previously, when a king or queen died, the judges that were appointed by them during 
their reign were replaced with judges appointed by the succeeding monarch. The new statute 
provided that judges would not be replaced solely because their sponsoring monarch died. This Act 
was never applicable, however, in the colonies, which was left with the old system, following the 
trend in pre-revolutionary times of having different rules in the colonies from those in place in 
• 
England. 
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Due to colonists having to live with the old, flawed system, when deciding what judicial 
selection system to adopt after the War ofIndependence, eight ofthe original thirteen states in the 
new United States placed the power ofappointment ofjudges in one or both houses ofthe legislature 
(Ashman, 8). The other states chose to give the power of appointment to their governors with 
consent ofa conformation committee made up ofstate legislators. 
Beginning in the mid-1800's, the appointment ofstate judges by the executive or legislature 
was extremely curtailed. The era spanning from the election ofAndrew Jackson in 1829 until the end 
of his tenure in office in 1837 was considered the era of "self-conscious American democracy" 
(Volcansek & Lafon, 88), and was called the era ofJacksonian Democracy. Jacksonian Democracy 
was motivated by general suspicion and distrust ofofficial power. The feeling ofthe people was that 
government should not be used to promote narrow interests and confer special privileges. Jackson 
•	 constantly emphasized that the majority was meant to govern, and that political appointments were 
a violation of this principle. This basic principle of Jacksonian democracy was translated into a 
variety of political reform movements that argued that all state officials should be elected, even 
judges, and thus accountable to the electorate. Delegates to the many individual state constitutional 
conventions held in the 1840's voted in nineteen of twenty-one states for constitutions that allowed 
for popular election as the process of selecting judges (Frontline). By the time of the Civil War, 
support for this Jacksonian principal of less powerful government had led to more changes in favor 
ofthe election system ofselecting judges. This resulted in a total oftwenty-four ofthirty-four states 
utilizing popular election ofjudges at the time (Ashman, 9). Every state that joined the union from 
1846 onwards ratified constitutions that provided for judicial elections (Frontline). 
• 
Dissatisfuction with the control afforded party "bosses" that was a consequence of the 
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electoral process, led to a counter-reform movement in the late 1800's. With the formation of a 
number ofassociations such as the American Bar Association, the call for the removal ofpolitics from 
the judicial selection process became strong. The cry was led by bar leaders who attempted to limit 
the powerful political parties' influence over the selection of judges by suggesting a variety of 
reforms. These reforms included nonpartisan ballots which allowed candidates to run independently 
and separate judicial nominating conventions and elections which allowed for the selection ofjudges 
to be separate and distance from the election of other political officials. These methods proved 
inadequate, however, to remove the effuctive control of political party leaders over elections. 
Influence over selection and nomination by local and state politicians remained just as strong and 
difficult to separate. Throughout the nineteenth century, most states decided to retain the electoral 
system, but concern over the adverse effects grew. These adverse effects included lack ofpolitical 
• 
independenceand decliningjudicial quality. Concerns over their effectswere increasinglyvoicedwith 
the approach ofthe twentieth century. This, in turn, has led to an increase ofhybrid systems and an 
expanding mix of systems being used within each state across the country during the twentieth 
century (Ashman, 10). 
Still today the debate over judicial election methods remains a controversial and lively one. 
The culmination of the debate are these hybrid methods that have mixed and matched the methods 
ofappointment and election. Support for a universal system throughout each state in the U.S. is 
strong to unifY the country behind one method. Expressing strong support was a Judicial Research 
Foundation Task Force comprising thirteen ofthe most knowledgeable trial court judges at the time. 
They identified the problem as the diversity ofthe methods that each state uses to select judges and 
stated that "selection of judges on a merit basis is the logical and well-proven answer. Partisan 
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political election bas too frequently and for too long firiled to produce a sufficient number ofjudges 
capable ofoptimumjudicial functioning. Nomination by a nonpartisanjudicial selection commission 
and appointment by the Governor bas proved to be the best method" (Logan, 64). Additionally, the 
Task Force found that "Better selection methods will come from aunified system ofcourts" (Logan, 
64). No steps have been taken as of yet to achieve this and it is probably unlikely that sweeping 
changes would be adopted in each state to achieve this. Many varieties of selection methods still 
remain in place nationwide. 
CURRENT METIIODS OF JUDICIAL SELECTION 
There are currently as many as five methods ofselection at the state level. Two are electoral 
• 
(partisan and nonpartisan elections); one is a functional equivalent offederal selection (gubernatorial 
selection); another is merit selection; and the last is legislative selection. As illustrated in Table One 
below, the methods utilized across the country differ greatly. They all offer advantages and 
disadvantages for each state in the selection of judges who are accountable to the public, the 
legislature, the governor, or who are independent. By far the most widely used system of selection 
is still the election system, with the next most popular merit selection or the Missouri Plan. 
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TABLE ONE 
• METHOD OF JUDICIAL SELECTION BY STATE 
Election (partisan and nonpartisan) 
Merit Selection 
Elected by Legislature 
Appointed by Governor 
• 
PARTISAN AND NONPARTISAN ELECTIONS 
In partisan elections, individuals run for judicial office for a fixed term under a party label. 
Candidates are nominated by partisan caucuses or primaries and then run on the party label in the 
November elections. Candidates may conduct a partisan campaign and be endorsed by party leaders 
and other candidates running for other offices. Nonpartisan elections are those in which judicial 
candidates must run without party designation and in which there are typically some restrictions as 
to the kind of campaign that may be waged. Candidates are generally selected by nonpartisan 
primaries and then run without party designation at a general election that is usually held in the spring 
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(Jacob, 99). Nonpartisan elections do not necessarily mean that political parties are unimportant, 
just that party labels so not appear on the ballots. In at least halfofthe states holding nonpartisan 
elections, parties actively campaign on behalf of candidates. Some states try to isolate judicial 
elections from partisanship by holding them separately from other elections. Judges are chosen by 
popular election in nearly half the states (Bums et al, 153). 
GUBERNATORIAL SELECTION 
Gubernatorial selection with the advice and consent ofanother political body (such as state 
senate, governor's council) is similar to the federal nomination system and is used only in the minority 
ofstates, probably a result ofthe migration to the election and Missouri plan methods during recent 
•	 years due to reluctance in having judicial appointment powers focused in the hands of one person 
(Goldman and Sarat, 255). This practice is used in Delaware, Maine, New Jersey, Hawaii, New 
York, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Vermont (Bums et al, 152). 
LEGISLATIVE SELECTION 
Legislative selection is only used nominally (Goldman and Sarat). While the full legislature 
is involved in the process ofselecting the person for the position, the governor is also very involved 
in the process, making it very similar to gubernatorial nomination with the exception that nominations 
come both from the legislature and the governor instead ofsolely from the governor. Care is taken 
in this process not to nominate anyone that is ''personally obnoxious" to key members of the house 
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and senate. Members are polled as to their feelings about the appointment of a particular judge, 
following a similar system for selecting judges at the federal level (Abraham, 27). This practice is 
used only in Connecticut, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Virginia (Bums et aI, 152). 
In both selection by legislature and by the governor, there may also be an informal process 
being set in motion in the background in which lawyers make their interest in becoming a judge 
known either directly or indirectly to other lawyers, bar associations, political leaders, and interest 
groups among many others, which then promote favored candidates. The names then go through the 
formal nominating process (Bums et aI, 153). This allows input from interested parties, without 
giving them total control of the process. 
MERIT SELECTION 
• Merit selection is the method advocated byjudicial reformers (Goldman and Sarat, 256). This 
method is also known as the hybrid "Missouri Plan," which combines both election and merit 
selection and is named after the first state to adopt the plan in 1940 (Goldman and Sarat, 256). For 
eachjudicialvacancy a nominating councilor commission consisting ofmembersoftheorganized bar, 
the judiciary, and the lay public, select a small group ofpeople qualified for the position, and present 
their names to the governor. The governor is legally required to make the final selection from this 
list ofqualified people. Some states use this as their primary method of selection, while some have 
selected it as a method of filling vacancies that occur between elections. The candidate that the 
governor has chosen may serve for a short term (sometimes one year) before a vote is held at the next 
general election which asks the electorate ifthe candidate should be retained in office and serve a full 
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tenn. Ifa majority of the voters agree, the judge serves a new full term. If not, another candidate 
is selected using the same procedure. At the end ofhis or her term, the judge certifies a wish to have 
his or her name placed on the ballot, and the voters are again asked whether they want to retain that 
judge in office. Therefore, the judges run against their own records, not against another person or 
party (Burns et al, 156). 
ELECTION vs. MERIT SELECTION 
The argument over method of selection ofjudges across the country involves the debate 
between advocates ofjudicial independence versus those advocatingjudicial accountability (Sheldon 
& Lovrich, 162). Proponents ofjudicial independence state that it is more important that the judge 
•	 be given the ability to be free in his decisions from considering the voter fallout ofthe decision They 
believe that the system that allows for this best is that of merit selection. It allows judges to be 
appointed by their peers and remain at liberty from the repercussions ofthe electorate or the political 
party (in partisan elections), should they make an unpopular decision Proponents of the election 
method ofselection argue that judicial accountability is more important than judicial independence. 
As the governmental system ofthe United States is founded upon government by consent, electoral 
selection is seen as the best method of ensuring that it remains that way. Many people see both 
independence and direct accountability to the electorate as important, and see a combination ofboth 
as a solution. Judicial recruitment is also often seen as something that must blend both of these 
conflicting requirements (Sheldon & Lovrich, 168). 
An additional problem that exists does not aid in the debate of which system is the best 
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method ofselection ofjudges across the country. This obstacle is that theorists and social scientists 
on both sides ofthe argument have been unable to quantitatively demonstrate that the type ofmethod 
used in selecting a judge actually makes a difference to the type ofperson who ends up serving at the 
bench (Sheldon & Lovrich, 170). Much research has focused on this subject, as many as twenty­
eight studies from 1965 to 1982 (Volcansek, 81). In a comprehensive review ofselection research, 
Gene Flango and Craig Ducat concluded that "Despite extensive research, no one has been able to 
show that different selection procedures produce differences in the characteristics of judges[,] 
decisions or courts" (F1ango & Ducat, 39). Research continues into the characteristics and 
performances ofjudges who are selected using the different methods, and comparisons and contrasts 
ofeach method will continue in the future as it has in the past, but as individualjudges are all different 
from each other experience, character, and morally, the limitations of the research will continue. 
• ILLINOIS 
Illinois has chosen the partisan election system. Judges in Illinois are nominated by their party 
and compete in general elections, usual1y in November. Each judge, in keeping with the general 
systemofelectingjudges, then later files his interest in retentionwhich is consequently voted on again 
with a general election. The judge must receive a positive vote from three-fifths or more of those 
voters expressing an opinion in order to remain in office. The Constitution ofIllinois allows for this 
process in Article VI - The Judiciary, Section 12, Election and Retention. The Constitution states 
"Supreme, Appellate andCircuit judges shall be nominatedat primaryelectionsor bypetition. Judges 
shall be elected at general orjudicial elections as the General Assembly shall provide by law" (White, 
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117). The requirement of three-fifths or more ofthe electorate who expressed an opinion doing so 
in the positive was changed from one-half or more in the 1970 Illinois Constitution (Kenney & 
Brown, 131). This was due to the filet that no judge had ever been denied retention and the 
requirement seemed too lenient. The present vote of three-fifths has not led to any judges being 
denied retention outside ofa large investigation into corrupt judges in the Chicago area in 1990when 
ten were dismissed. (Kenney & Brown, 131). 
mSTORY OF JUDICIAL SELECTION METHODS AND THEIR USE IN ILLINOIS 
In Illinois, the question ofthe type ofmethod to use for selecting judges is as strongly debated 
as elsewhere in the country. The electoral system that is used is criticized by opponents as too reliant 
• on party politics. These opponents advocate merit selection as a way to keep branches of the 
government separate. The conflict was never more apparent than in a compromise between 
proponents ofthe election process and proponents ofmerit selection in 1962 which allowed for initial 
partisan elections, but allowed the electorate to vote on whether to retain the judge as opposed to 
making the judge run against an opponent for retention (Kenney & Brown, 132). This compromise 
was the result ofmany months ofdebate between two opposite factions. 
As with many prior constitutional conventions throughout American history, judicialselection 
became a major issue ofthe 1969-70 Illinois constitutional convention. Two sides hotly debated the 
issue for many months. Both sides had motives that were influenced by principle and by what 
position would best serve their interests (Kenney & Brown, 132). It was not resolved until almost 
the fina1 day ofdebate (Kenney & Brown, 132). The two sides ofthe argument focused on whether 
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the state should retain elections for judicial selection, or change to the merit selection system. Those 
arguing for election stated that it was essential for an open, democratic society (Kenney & Brown, 
132). Those favoring merit selection stated that it would bring more professionalism and better 
judges to the judiciary. A resolution at the constitutional convention was not achieved, and the 
argument continued. It was finally settled with a referendum for voters to select the method that they 
preferred. In the referendum, the results were 50.2 percent voting for election selection, and 43 
percent votes for merit selection (Kenney & Brown, 133). As the results were so close, the 
compromise was made between the two systems. The results mirrored the split between the two 
sides with the suburban Cook County favoring merit selection and ruraI counties favoring the election 
system (Kenney & Brown, 132). 
The argument in Illinois continues today as within each state in the rest ofthe country. The 
•	 American Judicature Society, a nonpartisan organization with a national membership of judges, 
lawyers, and non-legally trained citizens interested in the administration ofjustice, sponsors an Illinois 
Committee on Judicial Independence (American Judicature Society) which publishes current efforts 
to revise the system. Current supporters ofmerit selection routinely debate and initiate discourse on 
the subject, including proposals for constitutional amendments. A Governor's Task Force on Judicial 
Merit Selection to propose a constitutional amendment was appointed by Governor Thompson in 
1987 (Kenney & Brown, 137). The Task Force found that merit selection should be implemented 
with appointed screening panel reviews after the judge has served for ten years. The plan again 
broul!ht much debate and was eventuallv defeated in the Senate Executive Committee hv a vote of
__	 '" . 01 
twelve to six (Kenney & Brown, 137). The subject remains an issue in the state oflllinois. 
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ANALYSIS OF THE ELECTION METHOD OF JUDICIAL SELECTION 
• 
As discussed above, Illinois has chosen the election method, but not without controversy. 
However, as this is the system currently in place, a deeper examination of the election method is 
needed in order to understand it more comprehensively. Because judicial selection methods are so 
controversial, it makes sense that many arguments extended by supporters as to the advantages and 
disadvantages ofeach system can be countered by logical reasoning. This is certainly the case with 
the election system. Proponents ofthe election method feel that election can achieve elimination of 
an elite group selecting judges. Thus the choices would be more representative ofthe people. They 
also feel that judges should be accountable to the people, like other elected officials, and that this 
would be accomplished by the election ofjudges just as in election ofother public officials. Yet 
•	 elections held to select other officials cannot be compared to those held to select judges. Under the 
Judicial Canons that govern election behavior for candidates ofthe judiciary, candidates are not free 
to speak about issues that may come before them, as they are forbidden to make prejudgements on 
these issues. They can only promote themselves as fair and honest. The campaigns ofother elected 
officials are not bound by these regulations, thus they cannot really be compared. The Canons were 
initiated to provide for an impartial judiciary that cannot afford to make prejudgements on public 
issues. Judges "perform purely technical and narrow legal tasks . .. [thus] their (the public) 
participation in the process ofstaffing the courts is wholly unnecessary" (Dubois, 23). 
Another asserted advantage of support for the election process states the need to remove 
elitist influence from the process. This may be undermined with the argument that most judges 
initially come to the bench by appointment, even when election is the primary method of selection 
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(Dubois, 109). Ifa sitting judge resigns in midterm, the governor is given the power to appoint a 
judge to fill the position. Furthermore, when a candidate has the benefit ofrunning as an incumbent, 
sIhe is more likely to be the winner of the judicial race in the next election - ifhe chooses to seek 
another term. Thus, the governor's influence enters into the selection process designed to eliminate 
elitist control. 
The nomination of the candidates for open judicial seats is again another decision denied the 
public in the election method ofselecting judges. Although interested candidates may campaign and 
received nomination without party support, party leaders genera1Jy get together to decide whom they 
will support and offer their select few to the public as affi1iates to vote on during the primary 
elections. This tends to place 1imitations on the choice that the electorate has in the selection ofthe 
candidates that they have to vote for as they lack awareness ofeverybody running for election. This 
• 
also takes the process out ofthe hands ofthose who know the candidates and their qua1ifications and 
puts it into the hands ofparty leaders whose loyalty remains party affi1iation, not the general public. 
Again, without party support, an otherwise suitable candidate may be overshadowed in the election 
process while party supported candidates are given more recognition due to their affi1iation. 
Proponents ofthe election method indicate that through retention elections, the sittingjudges 
are checked by the public, thus this method prevails over the merit selection in their eyes. By 
accountability, it is meant that if the electorate is not pleased with the performance of the judge, it 
has the power to remove him from office. Considered in this argument is that although voter turnout 
is higher for partisan elections as compared to nonpartisan elections, overall voter turnout for judicial 
primary and general elections is low compared to other political races. Voters are often not aware 
ofwhom or what they are voting for because they do not receive cues concerning how the candidates 
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stand on certain issues. Consequently, rather than make an irrational choice, most voters choose not 
to vote at all. There is a body of literature to suggest that low information leads to low turnout If 
they do vote, they rely on such factors as party affiliation or a popular name, lacking enough 
information on the personal characteristics, experience or ideology of the nominated judge to fill a 
seat in the court. The average citizen does not make it a point to check the record ofa sitting judge. 
In addition to this, a study onjudicial selection found that 'judicial elections do not serve as feedback 
devices for the judiciary" (Jacob, 1966), not providing the check as claimed. 
VOTER PARTICIPATION IN ILLINOIS/JACKSON COUNTY 
Traditionally, voter turnout in Illinois is high (Kenney & Brown, 33). The percentage of 
• 
people in Illinois who participate in elections is above the national average of50.1 percent in 1988 
at a total of 53 percent (Kenney & Brown, 33). This is slowly declining each year as voters 
participate less in each election, and certainly participate less in lower level, less important local races. 
As judicial races are not as important to the majority ofthe electorate as that ofpresident or governor 
oftheir state, participation injudicial elections locally could be expected to be low. In the 1990 U.S. 
Census, the total population ofpeople reported to be living in Jackson County aged 18 or over, and 
therefore considered to eligible to vote, totals 49, 467 out of a total population of 61 ,067 (U.S. 
Census, 1990). In the judicial elections held in Jackson County in 1988, turnout totaled 20,400, or 
41 percent ofthose eligible. As this turnout is below statewide norms for elections, unusual factors 
must exist which influence whether the potential electorate participates or not. In order to study 
whether these factors do detennine electoral participation, they must first be identified. 
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INFLUENCING FACTORS ON JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 
• 
Voter participation is reliant on many fuctors, both external and internal. External factors 
detennine whether potential voters will participate in a specific election. They may be descnbed as 
outside influences that help detennine the level ofvoter participation. These factors can range from 
knowledge ofthe candidates, publicity ofthe electoral race, and whether the race is partisan or not. 
Lack ofinformation about an election often leads to lack ofinterest in participating in that election. 
Internal factors also detennine whether a potential voter will participate in any electoral race. They 
tend to be more personal to the electorate and drive the likelihood ofparticipation from inside the 
voter. These factors include the voter's sociological identity, some not subject to change, such as 
age, race, and gender, and others that are such as education and income level. 
•	 The primary argument of used to justify elections as the best method of selecting judges in 
Illinois is that the public should be allowed to select their judges, and that the system is grounded in 
a democratic principle. Therefore, examination ofthe electoral turnout is required to examine ifvoter 
participation is high enough to justify the arguments in support of the method. 
EXTERNAL INFLUENCING FACTORS 
The distinction of external methods versus internal methods is that they are controlled by 
outside influences that the voter cannot control. There are several external factors that have been 
found to influence the results ofpartisanjudicial elections in Jackson County in any given year. These 
factors include election scheduling, bar association ratings, media coverage, party affiliation, and 
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incumbency. Althoughjudges do not face an adversary after being elected to the bench, they do face 
a retention election, which can also be influenced by some of the above-mentioned fuctors. Below 
is an outline of current nonns concerning each of the factors that have an external impact on the 
results ofpartisan and retention elections. 
The first external factor that should be considered is the scheduling ofelections. This refers 
to the year in which any given race for judicial office is held. In any election year, several races for 
office are held during the same election. Some races have a higher profile than others. These include 
presidential elections and gubernatorial elections. During presidential election years, voter 
participation is usually higher, a consequence ofmore publicity surrounding presidential campaigns. 
Other high profile campaigns include elections for governor and state senate. Surprisingly, however, 
even these races are sometimes not enough to persuade the electorate to vote on the day. Studies 
•	 confirm that even in the case where governor and senate races would be considered high salience 
races, voter turnout decreases in non-presidential election years (Milbrath, 35). So, when comparing 
judicial election voter turnout, a comparison must be made between the percentage ofturnout for the 
race that would be considered the most prominent for that particular election. This is to say that in 
presidential election years, the most prominent race would be the presidential race, and in non­
presidential years, it would be the race for the office ofGovemor or Senator, and so on, whichever 
is applicable. 
The next external factor that should be studied is bar association ratings on each judicial 
candidate. In spite ofCanon Seven, the public does have a few other sources to look for information 
on judicial candidates. One is the bar association rating ofjudicial candidates which is supported in 
Canon Eight which focuses on ethical considerations, (EC 8-6). "Generally, lawyers are qualified, 
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by personal observation and investigation, to evaluate the qualifications ofpersons seeking or being 
considered for such public offices, and for this reason they have a special responsibility to aid in the 
selection of those who are qualified" (American Bar Association, 45). 
In Illinois, the state bar association poDs lawyers, the peers ofprospective judicial candidates, 
and sitting judges. The questionnaire focuses on the candidate's temperament, integrity, and other 
personal qualities that the bar association feels would characterize a good judge. After the 
questionnaires are returned, the association hands down a rating spanning from "Strongly 
Recommended" to "Strongly Not Recommended" based upon the information gathered. Analysis 
has shown that although voters may use this information as a cue in selectingjudges, bar poDs remain 
in question because the results ofsuch polls are not always highly publicized and further, that lawyers 
who are polled are usually giving general answers because they often remain as uninformed as the 
• 
average voter (Dubois, 67). Research also suggests that lawyers favor incumbent judges, possibly 
because they fuel that prior experience is an important qualification or that they face a personal stake 
in the matter should negative responses concerning a sitting judge become known (Watson & 
Downing, 223). The results of a study conducted in 1987 by the Illinois Judicial Council Special 
Committee on the Selection ofJudges found that although the bar association plays a significant role 
in judicial selection in Illinois, there are many cases that show abuse in the rating process, where the 
buddy system leads to poor ratings ofopponents ofcolleagues and friends. (Hall, 19). Additionally, 
the system is often considered a way for the bar association to become involved in the election 
process. The bar association considers the merit selection method preferable to the election method 
as merit selection allows greater control over the process by the bar association and it's members 
(Jacob, 57). Consequently in 1998, the President of the American Bar Association sent a message 
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to the bar membership condoning and reinforcing the need for judicial independence (American Bar 
Association Journal). Additionally in 1999, the American Bar Association again publically affirmed 
its commitment to merit selection in a report resulting from an Ad Hoc Committee on Judicial 
Campaign Finance, Standing Committee on Ethics (American Bar Association). 
The third influencing external factor, media coverage, is associated in with the ratings ofbar 
associations. The media is responsible for bringing the results ofthese poDs to the public. "Ifvoters 
are provided with information onjudicial candidates ... they use it," indicates a study reported in the 
Social Science Quarterly (Johnson et al). Newspapers may even rate the candidates to give the 
public a more informed choice. Again, the problemhere could be lack ofinformation on candidates. 
Although news reporters may be more apt to conduct a background study of how a sitting judge 
performs, they have no real basis for recommending a lawyer who has never served on the bench. 
• 
Judicial elections are also unique as compared to other partisan elections because the 
candidates are restricted by the "Code ofJudicial Ethics." This limits the amount ofmedia coverage 
that they will or may receive. Formally referred to as the "Canons ofJudicial Ethics" (Canons). As 
outlined in Canon Seven (B) (I) (c) concerning political campaign conduct: 
"A candidate, including an incumbent judge ... should not make pledges or promises ofconduct in 
office other than the fuithful and impartial performance ofthe duties ofthe office; announce his views 
on disputed legal or political issues; or misrepresent his identity, qualifications, present position, or 
other filet" (American Bar Association, 69). 
Because of these restrictions, the public can gain little information in the media concerning 
judicial candidates. This may hinder the ability of the public to make an informed choice, as was 
concluded from an exit poll in Texas which showed that voters were generally unaware ofdifferences 
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between the candidates on the ballot form (McKnight, 99). Such research suggests that people tend 
not to vote for judicial candidates, although they cast their votes for candidates in other races. 
Evidence of this can be seen when comparing voter turnout figures for a given election. Usually, 
there is a drop-off rate of persons who vote in the more visible contest as compared to those who 
vote in judicial elections, especially retention elections. In a study on degree ofpublic awareness of 
judicial candidates and elections, it was found that 'Judicial elections are low-salience contests" 
(Ladinsky & Silver) which means that they are not high-profile enough to be important to the 
electorate. 
These unintentional restrictions appear to be stem from the beliefthat the judiciary is part of 
the government and must remain impartial and removed from public opinion. In developing these 
Canons, supporters feel that the judiciary protects its image ofdignity and independence. (Crane, 
• 
125). Opponents feel that this is a 'Judicial myth" in the sense that the judiciary cannot remain 
impartial or removed from the selection process whether it is election or merit selection. According 
to Stephen Daniels and Frank 1. Kopecky, "courts, as other governmental institutions, are political 
institutions, and judges, as other political officials, are political actors" (Crane, 125). 
The next external factor that should be considered is party affiliation. A partisan election 
requires judicial candidates to run under a party label (usual1y Democrat or Republican). Therefore 
examination should be undertaken to determine whether voters use party as a cue when voting in 
judicial elections, much like they do in other partisan elections. In a study of the relationship of 
voting behavior and party affiliation, Phillip DuBois finds that "on the average, voters in the partisan 
states are more likely to cast their votes along party lines than voters in the mixed and nonpartisan 
states" (DuBois, 74). 
• -21­
• 
The final influencing external fuctor relates to candidate incumbency. When a sitting judge 
vacates his or her seat in midterm, the governor appoints a replacement to serve until the term 
expires. Evidence indicates that the incumbent has the advantage of experience when running for 
election. Voters often identifY with his or her name and feel that a candidate with a proven record 
ofperformance will be the best choice. Though this fuctor has been noted to be more influential in 
nonpartisan elections which lack party as a cue for voting, "the incumbent judge... may puU voters 
away from their usual partisan preferences" (DuBois, 88). 
There are, therefore, five factors that may tend to influence judicial selection and voter 
participation in the election method ofselection. These include election scheduling, bar association 
ratings, media coverage, party affiliation, and incumbency. These factors may be studied to perhaps 
determine the likelihood ofvoter participation in anyjudicial election, and ifthat participation is high 
• enough to defend the use ofthe election method ofjudicial selection chosen in Illinois. 
INTERNAL INFLUENCING FACTORS 
In addition to external factors influencing judicial selection and voter participation, there are 
also several internal fuctors that influence the electorate's decision both whether to vote in an 
electoral race and also the vote direction that they cast. These factors mainly consist ofdemographic, 
social and economic fuctors such as age, gender, race, educational level, and social class. 
The age ofthe electorate is a significant factor in determining whether someone will vote or 
not. In 1972, suffrage was granted to 18 to 21 year olds, increasing the number ofeligible voters in 
the country. However, this population has 8 large proportion of people who pass up their first 
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opportunity to vote as voter turnout steadily declines each year (Flanigan & Zingale, 40). The
• likelihood ofvoting increase with age, as by the age ofthirty-five, most people have voted on at least 
one occasion. A small portion ofmiddle-aged to older group potential voters remain never having 
voted (Flanigan & Zingale, 41). Among all age groups, with 50 percent the 18 - 25 age range has 
the smallest group ofpeople responding affirmatively to a Center for Political Studies 1996 National 
Election Study poll questioning whether they have ever voted (Flanigan & Zingale, 41) This 
gradually increases and levels offat age 46 and up with 80 percent ofrespondents answering that they 
had participated (Flanigan & Zingale, 41). Increased participation with age is likely due to the fact 
that older voters are more settled in their lives, are already registered, and have more time to 
experience voting as an expected activity (Schmidt et al, 341). In the 1992 election, 38.5 percent 
ofthose aged 18 to 20 turned out to vote and 70.1 percent ofeligible people aged 65 and over turned 
• out to vote. (See Table Two, Page 22). 
TABLE TWO 
VOTING IN THE 1992 PRESIDENTIAL 
ELECTION BY AGE GROUP (IN PERCENTAGE) 
AGE REPORTED TURNOUT 
(%) 
18-20 38.5 
21-24 45.7 
25-34 53.2 
35-44 63.6 
..nn 
IV.v45-64 
65 and over 70.1 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
• 
overnment Printing Office, 1994). Data are for 1992. 
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• Educational level is also significant in detennining whether an eligible person will ever vote. 
The higher the education level ofa person, the higher the possibility ofparticipation in the electoral 
system. Pursuit ofan education away from home by younger people, however, is determined to stop 
people from voting as failure to meet resident requirement. In addition to this hurdles of initial 
registration create barriers and desire to vote in short-term local level elections also deter students 
from voting. Therefore, in general, the more education a person has, the more likely they are to vote, 
with the exception of those in the process ofgaining an education. Reported turnout in the 1992 
presidential election was 30 percentage points higher for those with a college education than it was 
for those who had never been to high school (Schmidt et al, 341). One activist for low income 
workers states in the book Politics and the Class Divide that "I would say to a very large degree the 
better the education, the much greater chance that, not only are they aware already of what the 
problems are, but they're also more perceptive and responsive to solutions (Crouteau, 155). These 
references are almost always targeted toward the college educated. Many believe that high schools 
and grade schools teach only compliance and complacency and not creativity and other thinking 
schools. This suggests that those with a high school education will be less likely to vote (See Table 
Three), but that ifthey do, they may be more inclined to vote for an incumbent politician following 
the system that is already in place instead oflooking toward creating a new one. 
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TABLE THREE 
VOTING IN THE 1992 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 
BY EDUCATION LEVEL (IN PERCENTAGE) 
YEARS OF SCHOOL REPORTED TURNOUT 
COMPLETED (%) 
8 years or less	 35.1 
9-11 years	 42.2 
12 years	 57.5 
1-3 years of college	 68.7 
4 + years of college	 81.0 
Source:	 U.S. Department ofCommerce, Statistical Abstract ofthe United States (Washington, D.C.: U.S 
Government Printing Office, 1994). Data are for 1992. 
• 
Social class and related income is a third type ofinternal factor that may impact the likelihood 
ofa person to vote. Differences exist in the economic and social interests ofsocial classes, and these 
interests will determine whether a person will vote or not. The middle to high social classes are more 
likely to vote as they are usually more connected to community groups and organizations leading to 
familiarity and knowledge of the people involved in the process, which in turn leads to greater 
turnout. So, the greater the income, the more likely a person is to join a voluntary association 
(Crouteau, 49). Social class is ofcourse linked to income levels. Wealthier people tend to be over 
represented in the electorate. In the 1992 presidential election, income levels ofpeople who voted 
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in the election ranged from 40 percent ofthose eligible in the $15,000 and under income level group 
to 70 percent of those eligible in the $50,000 and over income level group (Schmidt et ai, 341). 
Additionally, those people with low incomes and working class status are more likely to become 
disillusioned with a system that has not been particularly beneficial to them. The most common 
critique ofworkers toward politicians is that today's officials seem more out of touch with regular 
people (Crouteau, 57). Worker's believe that the government used to be more responsive than it 
currently is, and participation is seen as not making a difference in lack ofresponse (Crouteau, 57). 
In addition, wealthy politicians are seen by the working class as promoting the interests of other 
wealthy citizens at the expense ofworkers (Crouteau, 57). Wealth, then, serves to isolate politicians 
from regular citizens, leading to disinterest in a system that does not serve the working class, leading 
in turn to lack ofdesire to participate. 
• 
Race is another factor in determining voting participation. Typically, and due to historical 
conditions, a white person is more likely to vote than a minority person. In the 1992 presidential 
election, whites participated at 59 percent ofthose who were eligible to 51.5 percent ofblacks who 
were eligible (Schmidt et al, 341). Equal access to the ballot box and equal opportunity to 
participate in politics in other ways did not effectively exist for minorities until the mid 1960s 
(Conway, 24). Election procedures in place before this time tended to discourage minority 
participation by allowing local election officials to establish irregular hours for voting and to provide 
inadequate procedures for absentee voting in areas that were traditionally concentrated with a 
population of :r.morities (Conway, 24). With c!'.l!!lges in these IRws, pa.rticipation for blacks ha~ 
increased steadily, but when comparing blacks and whites ofthe same other internal factors such as 
class, education etc., blacks are still somewhat less likely to vote than whites (Conway, 24). 
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Additionally, blacks and other minorities are greatly under represented in government, causing a lack 
of identification with the government by blacks. 
Gender is the fifth determinate ofvoting participation. Historically, women were denied the 
vote until granted suffrage under the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920. Until recently, women have 
been less likely to vote than men, when taking into consideration their greater population numbers in 
the United States. In the book American Voter, the author describes this phenomenon as resulting 
from the deeper ingrained roles ofthe female gender in the American culture that for many years made 
the man the person in the family to make the political decisions (Campbell et al, 484). Campbell et 
al. also found in their 1960 political participation interviews that many women referred him to their 
hushands to give the interview, still feeling uncomfortable about having an opinion about the topic and 
feeling that "politics is for men" (Campbell et al, 485). As women now vote more than men, the 
•	 absolute size oftheir vote has increased to be larger than that ofvotes by men, not the average two­
thirds that is has previously been the norm (Campbell et al, 484). Although this research discusses 
life and opinions in the I 960s in reference to political participation, and today women now vote more 
than men, America has still to elect some women president or vice-president. As with race, the 
characteristics ofthe federal level government still badly under represents the group when compared 
to the national population. The characteristics of the 105th Congress (1997 to 1999) reflect this: 
women comprised II percent of the House and 9 percent of the Senate. This compares to the 51 
percent population ofwomen nationwide as reported in the U.S. Census of1990 (Schmidt et al, 399). 
(See Table Four). 
When combined together, the demographic, social and economic factors described above 
represent a group of internal fuctors that affect whether a population participates in the political 
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process. These characteristics are either invariable (age, race and gender) or variable (education, 
income). Demographic factors that cannot be changed combine with factors that may be to shape the 
likelihoodofvoter turnout. The socioeconomic factors ofeducation and income have been shown to 
significantly determine participation. The higher a person's socioeconomic status, the more likely is 
he or she to vote (Olsen, lSI). Research conducted in the book Why Americans Don't Vote identifies 
three effects that socioeconomic status has on voter turnout: a) the higher the level of educational 
attainment, the more likely a person is to vote; (b) the less manual the occupation, the more likely a 
person is to vote; and (c) the higher the level ofincome, the more likely a person is to vote (Teixeira, 
21). In addition to this, demographic factors such as age, race, and gender impact for participation 
but that impact changes across socioeconomic status. Thus, a young, black woman is more likely to 
vote ifshe is college educated and has a high income than is she were less educated and lower in social 
• 
status. 
Just as variable and invariable factors influence whether a person will participate in the political 
process, so too does the factor ofwhether the potential voter feels that his or her group is represented 
in the govermnent or office pertaining to the election. The American system is a representative 
democracy where choices are made by a small group that effect the larger group (Flanigan & Zingale). 
The less the potential voter feels that he or she is or has been represented in the past or will be in the 
future, the less likely he or she is to vote. The groups that are less likely to participate in the political 
process include people who are black, female, low income, less educated or young. When examining 
these fuets silnultaneously with the characteristics of the federal government, groups who are less 
likely to vote surely feel under represented. The average federal elected official is a white, college 
educated male with a high incomewho is around fifty. The characteristics oftheIOSth Congress (1997 
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to 1999) show that women account for only 9 to 11 percent ofpoliticians (Schmidt et a1, 399). It is
• also true that 93 to 94 percent ofpoliticians in Congress have college degrees (Schmidt et a1, 399). 
There were also no blue-collar workers in Congress (Schmidt et al, 199). (See Table Four). 
TABLE FOUR 
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE 105'" CONGRESS 
(1997 TO 1999) 
CHARACTERISTIC U.S. POPULAnON HOUSE SENATE 
Age (median) 33.0 50.9 57.4 
Percentage minority 28.0 13.5 4.0 
• 
Percentage Female 51.9 11.0 9.0 
Percentage with college degrees 21.4 93.0 94.0 
Occupation 
Percentage lawyers 2.8 39.0 54.0 
Percentage blue collar workers 20.1 0.0 0.0 
Family Income 
Percentage of families earning 
over $50,000 annually 22.0 100.0 100.0 
Personal wealth 
Percentage of population with 
assets over $1 million 0.7 16.0 33.0 
Source: Schmidt et al. 
• 
Research has demonstrated then, that external influencing factors ofelection scheduling, media 
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coverage, bar association rating, party affiliation, and incumbency and internal influencing filctors of 
age, race, gender, economic status and educational level impact the participation of the electorate in 
elections. To examine the impact of these factors on judicial elections, this case study focuses on 
judicial elections in Jackson County, Illinois. This study identifies a hypothesis to identitY possible 
influencing filctors and the result of participation from each. It then examines available data in 
connection with those hypotheses in determining whether each hypothesis may be confinned. 
STUDY OF EXTERNAL INFLUENCING FACTORS IN JACKSON COUNTY 
In order to determine which external factors influence voters in Jackson County in Southern 
Illinois, voter records were examined from 1976 to 1988. These records were selected in order to 
• 
utilize information for both externa1 and internal factors. As the last official census was collected in 
1990, information from voting records from 1988 contained the data needed to aUow examination of 
both factors, and was thus the last data to be collected. Although the focus ofthis study is the judicial 
election, it was necessary to collect data on voting behavior for other races such as presidential 
candidates, gubernatorial candidates, and senatorial candidates. While the 1988 election was the 
primary focus, data was also collected for previous elections to determine if patterns existed 
concerning Jackson County's voting behaviorinjudicial elections. During the period of1976 to 1988, 
there were elevenjudicial partisan elections and twenty-five retention elections; many occurring in the 
same election year. Several hypotheses can be inferred from the data gathered. 
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HYPOTIlESIS ONE 
Judicial election voter turnout figures will show a marked increase during presidential election 
years as compared to non-presidential election years. 
METIIODS AND ANALYSIS 
Data comparing the mean voter turnout for judicial retention elections indicates that voter 
turnout is higher in presidential election years than for non-presidential years. The data shows that 
in the 1986 race for Governor, the actual voter turnout was 15,688. The mean voter turnout for 
judicial elections in the same year (see Appendix A) was 11,195. 
• 
These numbers increase to 21,185 and 15,318 respectively in 1988 when the race includes a 
presidential contest. Similar patterns can be determined when comparing high and low salience races 
from 1976 through 1988. 
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TABLE FIVE 
VOTER TURNOUT FOR HIGH SALIENCE RACES
 
AS COMPARED TO THE MEAN VOTER
 
TURNOUT FOR JUDICIAL RETENTION ELECTIONS
 
JACKSON COUNTY. ILLINOIS
 
YEAR HIGH SALIENCE ACTUAL MEAN VOTER DIFFERENCE IN VOTE 
RACE" VOTER TURNOUT IN TURNOUT FOR HIGH 
TURNOUT RETENTION SALIENCE RACES AS 
• 
ELECTIONS COMPARED TO 
RETENTION ELECTION 
1976 President 24,132 15,594 8,538 
1978 State Rep. 14,573 8,884 5,689 
1980 President 23,829 15,139 8,680 
1982 Governor 17,928 12,247 5,681 
1984 President 25,896 16,674 9,222 
1986 Governor 15,688 I 1,195 4.493 
1988 President 21,185 15,318 5,867 
• Determined by race in which the most votes were cast. 
Because there were no judicial partisan elections in the non-presidential election years under 
examination, no conclusions could be formed about those elections. However, when comparing the 
mean voter turnout for judicial partisan elections to retention elections (see Table Five, page 31), the 
number ofparticipants in the partisan races highly exceeds that ofthe retention elections. This could 
meal). th.at more campaign activity between candidates in partisan election produces more interest a.'1d 
information about the election, both positive influencing fuctors relating to voter turnout. 
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COMPARING VOTER TURNOUT
 
FOR PARTISAN JUDICIAL ELECTIONS
 
AND RETENTION ELECTIONS
 
(BASED ON MEAN VOTER TURNOUT
 
YEAR* VOTER TURNOUT FOR VOTER TURNOUT FOR NUMERICAL 
PARTISAN ELECTION RETENTION ELECTION DIFFERENCE 
1976 22,552 15,594 6,958 
1980 21,190 15,139 6,051 
1988 19,622 15,318 4,304 
*Included are those years in which partisan elections and retention elections occurred simultaneously. 
• 
When comparing actual voter turnout in high salience races to the mean voter turnout for the 
retention elections, an interesting note here is that during non-presidentialyears, the gap betweenthose 
who vote in the high salience race and judicial race narrows. (See Table Seven, page 33). This may 
indicate that the voters who do participate in non-presidential elections are more apt to complete their 
ballots, or that as they are the most motivated and informed voters they have the knowledge about the 
race that enables them to make choices even in low salience, low information elections. 
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• TABLE SEVEN VOTER TURNOUT FOR HIGH SALIENCE (PRESIDENTIAL) RACES 
AS COMPARED TO THE MEAN VOTER
 
TURNOUT FOR PARTISAN JUDICIAL ELECTIONS
 
JACKSON COUNTY, ILLINOIS
 
YEAR ACTUAL MEAN VOTER JUDICIAL ELECTION NUMERICAL 
VOTER TIJRNOUTIN PARTY AFFILIATION DIFFERENCE 
TURNOUT PARTISAN OF FAVORED CANDIDATE 
ELECTIONS 
1976 24,132 22,552 Democrat 1,577 
1980 23,829 21,190 Democrat 2,639 
Democrat 
Republican 
• 
1988 21,185 19,622 Republican 1,563 
Democrat 
Democrat 
Democrat 
Democrat 
Democrat 
Republican 
Further evidence ofdifferences invoter turnout can be found by comparing data in Table Seven 
and Table Five (pages 33 and 31). The gap between voter turnout for the high salience race and 
judicial partisan elections is not as wide as that of the high salience race and retention elections, 
possibly an indication of voter fatigue, Voter fatigue likely develops because the judicial retention 
question is placed by statute on the seventh or eighth page near the end ofthe ballot (See Appendix 
C). Voters who tend to vote only in presidential elections are not as interested in other sections on 
the ballot and tend to disregard some questions toward the end. Thus, it appears that voters brought 
out to vote by the presidential election may prefer to cast votes in all the contested races at the 
• 
beginning ofthe ballot whereas the more dedicated voter tends to complete the whole ballot. 
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HYPOTHESIS TWO 
• 
Judicial candidates will not be elected or retained ifthey receive an unfavorable rating from the 
Illinois State Bar Association. 
METIIODS AND ANALYSIS 
This hypothesis should be tested across two groups, candidates who are running for office and 
those who are seeking retention. In the data collected and studied, there were eleven separate partisan 
elections from 1976 through 1988 and seven retention elections in the same period. 
Of the eleven separate elections, only four candidates were rated "Strongly Not 
•	 Recommended" by the Illinois State Bar Association. The remaining candidates received fuvorable 
ratings, with the exception being the Republican candidate, Welch, who in 1980 was not given a rating 
because the Bar was not notified of his candidacy soon enough to issue a rating. Three of the four 
candidates that received an unfavorable rating lost his or her bid for a seat on the bench. Lowery 
(1988) the fourth candidate, defeated his recommended opponent by a mere 0.7 percent (152 out of 
19002) of the vote, which appears to suggest that Lowery's reputation with the local electorate 
outweighed the ratings of the bar association. 
Judges who are seeking retention must have fewer than 70 points out of100 oftotaled scores 
:from coID-pleted questiO!LnRires. Ollly Judge South W:I!': rate as UStrongly Not R_ecoITunended" durLng 
this period, but as data shows, he was retained in office. As noted in Table Three on Judicial 
Retention Elections, Judge Richman barely received a recommendation by the Illinois State Bar 
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YEAR" 
1980 
Appellate 
Court 
1988 
Supreme• Court 
Appellate 
Court 
PARTISAN JUDICIAL ELECTION RESULTS 
JACKSON COUNTY, ILLINOIS 
CANDIDATE NUMBER OF TOTAL VOTER 
VOTES TURNOUT 
(0) Green.l 13,788 22,552 
(R) Ridgeway 8,764 
(0) Hood.l (I) 11,168 21,924 
(R) South 10,756 
(0) Howerton .I (I) 11,460 21,010 
(R) Powless 9,550 
(0) Mays J( 10,243 20,637 
(R) Welch * 10,394 
(0) Beedle J( 6,460 20,400 
(R) Gilbert .I (I) 13,940 
(0) Watt .I (I) 14,526 20,305 
(R) Isaacs J( 5,779 
(0) Calvo 10,423 19,762 
(R) Welch .I 9,339 
(0) Howerton .I 13,003 19,736 
(R) Evers 6,733 
(0) Chapman 10,849 19,234 
(R) Keenan 8,385 
(0) Goldenhersch 10,059 18,913 
(R) Long 8,854 
(0) Rarick 9,425 19,002 
(R) Lowery J( 9,577 
.I Recommended by the SoU/hem Illinoisan
 
J( Strongly Not Recommended by the Illinois State Bar Association
 
* Write-in Candidate; lIui raied by Illinois Staie Bar Association 
(0) Democrat party affiliation (R) Republican party affiliation 
(I) Incumbent 
• 
Included are those years when races were held for partisan judicial elections. Appellate and Supreme Court 
candidates have previous judicial experience, except for Long (1988). 
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•	 Association. Categories such as judicial temperament, judicial integrity, etc. are weighed differently 
in importance, therefore a candidate can score below average in one or more, without bringing down 
the total score below the 70 points needed for recommendation. Thus, based upon the information 
here, judges who seek election are affected by their bar association ratings, whereas judges seeking 
retention are not. 
• 
It should be remembered, however, that in retention elections, judges are rarely removed from 
the bench. By looking at the actual voter turnout figures (Table Five, page 31) for these particular 
elections as compared to other retention elections of 1986, a vast difference can be seen when 
comparing the numbers ofaffirmative votes and negative votes. In the remaining four elections, the 
affirmative votes exceed 7,000 votes while the votes in this same category for Richman and South are 
below 7,000. Looking at the negative votes ("no"), the turnout figures are higher for Richman and 
South as compared to the other four judges. This information indicates two findings. First, when 
subtracting the negative votes from the affirmative votes, the difference is smaller for Richman and 
South, thus they were retained by a slimmer margin. Secondly, upon adding the total votes cast in 
each ofthese elections, the results show a higher turnout rate for the Richman and South elections. 
It may be inferred from this that because of the publicized negative ratings by the Illinois State Bar 
Association people had information on which to base their decision, thus the turnout was greater in 
these two instances. Additionally, it appears that voters carne out not necessarily to cast their votes 
for these candidates, but rather to vote against them. 
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HYPOTHESIS THREE 
Media coverage will have a positive effect on voter turnout in judicial partisan and retention 
elections. 
METIIODS AND ANALYSIS 
• 
Comparing data in much the same way as that in the category of the influence of the Illinois 
State Bar Association, the effect that a positive recommendation by the Southern Illinoisan area 
newspaper had on voter turnout was examined. (See Table Eight, page 36). For eachjudicial partisan 
race (except in the case ofMays v. Welch, 1980), one candidate was recommended over the other by 
the Southern Illinoisan in its Editorial section. Based upon the data, voter turnout was not influenced 
by the Southern Illinoisan as it remained significantly unchanged during 1980 when the newspaper did 
not express a preference. The results suggest that the newspapers endorsement may have, however, 
affected the success ofthe candidates. Based upon election results from these races, 70 percent ofthe 
fuvored candidates won their elections. Because none ofthe judicial retention candidates were termed 
"not recommended" by the Southern Illinoisan, there was no data to prove or disprove these 
hypotheses for retention elections. 
HYPOTHESIS FOUR 
Party affiliation will be a cue to voters in judicial partisan elections, much like it is for other 
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partisan elections. 
METHODS AND ANALYSIS 
When reviewing data represented in Table Eight (page 36), it appears that voters in Jackson 
County fuvor Democratic judicial candidates. In two of the three races where the Republican 
candidate was victorious, the results show very close races. First, the Mays v. Welch race (1980) was 
characterized by a "Strongly Not Recommended" bar association rating for Mays and no rating from 
the bar for the write-in candidate Welch. The public most probably was torn between its allegiance 
to the Democratic candidate and the negative rating of this candidate. Additionally, Welch, a 
republican, was endorsedbythe Southern Illinoisan, yet was still defeated by the democratic candidate 
• 
Mays. Turning to the Rarick v. Lowery race (1988), here again was the struggle ofwhether or not 
to choose the "faithful party" candidate. In this election, Lowery was well known in the area and his 
opponent was from Troy, Illinois, leading to a conflict between familiarity and party loyalty. This 
struggle combined with the conflicting ratings from the State Bar Association made for a tight race 
that was tipped in Lowery's fuvor. The exception to this is the judicial race ofBeedle v. Gilbert. This 
race defied the correlationsmade here concerningjudicial elections and party affiliation. This race was 
extremely different and is descnbed later. 
The above synopsis shows that Jackson County voters tended to fuvored Democratic judicial 
candidates overRepublicanjudicial candidates and is typical ofthe overall voting tendency ofJackson 
County. Another way to test whether party is used as a cue for voting in judicial elections is to 
examine voting in judicial elections where candidates are not free to discuss issues and to compare it 
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to the party affiliation for the favored candidate in the high salience races and the party affiliation for 
the favored candidate in judicial elections. (See Table Seven, page 33). This comparison will show 
ifvoters "carry-over" voting behavior from high salience races to judicial races. Upon examination 
ofthe data which shows very nominal differences in turnout, there is no true relationship here. This 
may be accredited to the minimal number of studied election years in which partisan elections were 
held. 
HYPOTIIESIS FIVE 
Judicial incumbents in partisan elections will be victorious. 
• 
METHODS AND ANALYSIS 
There were four judicial partisan races where one candidate was an incumbent running to be elected 
to his appointed seat. Every incumbent candidate proved victorious. (See Table Eight, page 36). 
There could be interrelated factors at work here. These same four incumbents were also 
recommended by the Southern Illinoisan newspaper. Though it could be that the newspaper gives 
preference to incumbents, relying on their experience to make them a good judge, a trait that voters 
also tend to follow. In addition to this scenario, all the incumbentjudges were democrats, a factor that 
could also influence voters in a traditionally democratic county. 
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EXTERNAL STIJDY CONCLUSIONS 
• 
It is easy to see how the external influencing factors were first identified during prior research 
ofjudicial elections. Upon comparing most of the election data, the relationship between factors is 
quickly recognizable. The hypothesis that judicial election turnout will increase during presidential 
elections was confirmed partially. It appears to be true that more voters turnout in presidential 
election years, although we actually see more participants in retention elections in non-presidential 
years. Another hypothesis that appears to be somewhat confirmed is that judicial candidates will not 
be elected or retained if they receive an unfavorable rating from the Illinois State Bar Association. 
Although the findings were not 100 percent perfect, there is evidence ofan influence on voters by bar 
poll ratings. Even in retention elections, candidates seem to be retained by slimmer margins if they 
receive unfavorable ratings. Also an influence on public opinion, media coverage might appear to 
increase voter awareness. Thus, the hypothesis that media coverage will have a positive affect on 
voter turnout injudicialpartisan and retention elections could probably be confirmed. Although it can 
be identified that Jackson County favors Democratic judicial candidates, it may be insufficient to 
warrant support ofthe hypothesis that party affiliation is a cue to voters injudicial partisan elections. 
The fina1 hypothesis that judicial incumbents in partisan elections will be victorious appears to have 
somewhat strong support, with no incumbents having been voted out of office during the period 
studied (1976 to 1988). From all the hypotheses and data studied, it does appear that overall Jackson 
County may in fact follow noted norms ofjudicial elections. 
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STUDY OF INTERNAL INFLUENCING FACTORS IN JACKSON COUNTY 
As mentioned previously, voter turnout in Jackson County totaled 20,400 in the judicial 
elections in 1988. This turnout is below the norms of53 percent for tbe state in presidential elections 
at 41 percent ofthe 49,467 potentially eligible to vote. An examination ofthese statistics and the 1990 
• 
U.S. Census data may explain the reason for low turnout when looking into possible internal 
influencing factors as education, gender, race, age, and income. A comparison ofexpected turnout 
and actual turnout was conducted to see if Jackson County met normal voting conditions for each 
internal voting fuctor. (See Appendix A, page 50). However, it should be noted that this study is 
extremely limited and offers little beyond conjecture. It merely uses averages from census data and 
does not have any primary statistics to utilize. In order to study these factors in a more conclusive 
manner which allows for correlations between the influencing fuctors and voter participation to be 
drawn correctly, data would have to be gathered as to the actual characteristics ofthose who did vote 
in the judicial elections selected for review. As this is not possible for elections that have already taken 
place, a study was made of the averages and is limited in significance as mentioned above. 
HYPOTHESIS ONE 
Low voter turnout in Jackson County may be caused by a younger population than the state 
and national norms that lives in the area due to the presence ofSouthern Illinois University. 
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METIIOD AND ANALYSIS 
• 
When reviewing the 1990 U.S. Census data in Appendix A, it shows that there is a potential 
electorate of49,467 people, that is those aged 18 or over. The number ofpeople in each age group 
shows 8,302 people aged 18 - 20 years (or 17 percent ofpotential electorate), 8,973 people aged 21­
24 years (\ 8 percent), 9,818 people aged 25 - 34 years (20 percent), 7,268 people aged 35 - 44 years 
(15 percent), 8,531 people aged 46 - 64 (17 percent), and 6,575 people aged 65 or older (13 percent). 
Previous information discussed relating to previous participation of these age groups shows that 
potential voters aged 18 - 20 years have voting participation rates of38.5 percent. Potential voters 
aged 21 - 24 years have voting participation ratesof45.7 percent. Potential voters aged 25 - 34 years 
have voting participation rates of 53.2 percent. Potential voters aged 35 - 44 years have voting 
participation rates of63.6 percent. Potential voters aged 45 - 64 years have voting participation rates 
of70 percent, and potential voters aged 65 and over have voting participation rates of 70.1 percent. 
Therefore, statistically it can be expected that in Jackson County 3,196 people aged 18 - 20 years will 
vote, 5,335 people aged 21 - 24 years will vote, 5,223 people aged 25 - 34 years will vote, 4,623 
people aged 35 - 44 years, 5,971 people aged 45 - 64 years will vote, and 4609 people aged 65 and 
over will vote. Thus, when applying national normal voting patterns to Jackson County could expect 
a vote of28,957. The figures as previously mentioned for voting participation in the 1988 judicial 
election in Jackson County was 20,400, a difference of8,557. Jackson County would meet the state 
norm of53 percent ifthe additional 8,557 people had voted as expected. Ifthe population ofJackson 
County was consistent with the national norm, the group with the highest population would be 25 ­
34 year, it is possible that this discrepancy would be made up. Thus, it may be possible that the cause 
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ofthis low turnout in relation to the national average is caused by the larger young population who 
are less likely to vote, taking low percentage possibilities ofturnout. Therefore, another county with 
an older population could expect a larger turnout ifvoting followed national nonns. With almost 35 
percent ofthe potential electorate being aged 24 years or younger, the effect on the total voter turnout 
in Jackson County may therefore be expected to he lower than the national norm for as long as 
younger people continue to vote less than older ones. 
HYPOTHESIS TWO 
A university town may have higher levels ofcollege educated people, which should therefore 
translate into an increased voter turnout. 
METHOD AND ANALYSIS
• 
When reviewing the 1990 U.S. Census data in Appendix A, it shows that there is a potential 
electorate of49,467 people, that is those aged 18 or over. The nwnber ofpeople in each education 
range shows 3,376 people with 8 yrs or less ofschoo1ing (or 7 percent ofpotential electorate), 4,420 
people aged with 9 to II years ofschooling (9 percent), 9,604 people with 12 years ofschooling (19 
percent), 21,086 people with 1 - 3 years ofcollege, and 10,981 people with 4 plus years of college. 
Average statistics discussed relating to previous participation ofthese educational groups show that 
as education increases, so does the nwnber ofpeople who vote in elections. These statistics are as 
follows: people with 8 yrs or less ofschooling have average turnout rates of35.1 percent, people with 
9 - II years ofschooling have average turnout rates of42.2 percent, people with 12 years ofschooling 
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have average turnout rates of 57.5 percent, people with I - 3 years ofcollege have average turnout 
rates of8.7 percent, and people with 4 plus years ofcollege have average turnout rates of81 percent. 
• 
Therefore, it could probably be expected that in Jackson County, an increase ofvoting participation 
for those in the college-educated category would occur that would lead to more turnout, certainly a 
turnout above national average, as a town in which a university is present certainly has a larger than 
normal presence of college educated people. When applying national normal voting patterns to 
Jackson County, the county could expect a vote of31 ,952. The figures as previously mentioned for 
votingparticipation in the 1988judicial election in JacksonCountywas20,400, a difference oft I,552. 
Jackson County would meet the state norm of 53 percent if the additional 11,552 people had voted 
as expected. It may be possible that the cause of this turnout discrepancy is the large numbers of 
people who are in currently in college pursing an education. This situation has been determined to be 
one in which people are more transient and therefore have a larger barrier to voting locally. Thus, 
although a large proportion of the potential electorate in Jackson County has a college education 
which should lead to larger voter turnout, the fact that many ofthem are transient and still studying 
leads to less turnout, with more restrictions are placed on the ability of those people to vote. The 
effect on the total voter turnout in Jackson County may therefore be expected to be lower than the 
national norm for as long as people attending college are less likely to vote than those who are not 
pursuing an education. (See Table Three, page 25). 
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HYPOTHESIS THREE 
As Jackson County is located in a rural area, turnout will be lower than the national average 
due to the generally lower income associated with its geography and population. 
METHOD AND ANALYSIS 
• 
When reviewing the 1990 U.S. Census data in Appendix A, it shows that there is a potential 
electorate of49,467 people, that is those aged 18 or over. In order to examine income, however, the· 
number of households is counted rather than individuals. The number of households in Jackson 
County who have an income of$15,OOO or less is 10,484. This figure is an astonishing 47 percent of 
the number of the 23,491 households counted. The median income for Jackson County is $17,500 
to $19,999. National average participation of income groups shows that 40 % ofpeople with and 
income of$15,000 vote, whereas 70 percent ofthose with incomes of$50,000 or more vote. Thus, 
it can be expected that in Jackson County the turnout would be lower than the state average ifpeople 
followed traditional patterns for voting behavior. The figures as previously mentioned for voting 
participation in the 1988 judicial election in Jackson County was 20,400, only 41 percent of those 
eligible to vote, but almost exactly the figure that could be expected from a low income population. 
Jackson County would meet the state norm of53 percent ifthe income median was increased. Thus, 
another county with a population that has a higher income, such as Cook County could expect a larger 
turnout ifvoting followed national norms. The effect on the total voter turnout in Jackson County of 
having residents with low incomes would be that oflowering the expected turnout. 
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HYPOlHESIS FOUR 
Race and gender have no significant influence on voter turnout in Jackson County. 
METHOD AND ANALYSIS 
• 
When reviewing the 1990 U.S. Census data in Appendix A (page50), it shows that there is a 
potential electorate of49,467 people, that is those aged 18 or over. 51 percent ofthese are male and 
49 percent ofthese are female. 85 percent ofthese are white, and 15 percent ofthese are minorities. 
Previous figures determine that women now vote more than men, and minorities vote less than whites. 
Thus, it could possibly be expected that in Jackson County the turnout would be higher than the 
national average ifpeople followed traditional patterns for voting behavior. The figures as previously 
mentioned for voting participation in the 1988 judicial election in Jackson County was 20,400, only 
41 percent ofthose eligible to vote, not the higher figure that could be expected from a predominantly 
white population. In relation to gender, however, the presence ofalmost equal men and women in the 
county indicates that voter turnout should be higher, as nationally the population consists of more 
women than men. Thus, another county with a more racially mixed, gender norm population could 
expect a lower turnout ifvoting followed national norms. The effect on the total voter turnout in 
Jackson County ofhaving residents who are white and equally male and female should be a positive 
effect on turnout, not the negative 12 percent less ofthe state average that has occurred. 
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INTERNAL STUDY CONCLUSIONS 
It is easy to see how the internal influencing factors were first identified during prior research 
of judicial elections. Upon comparing most of the election and U.S. Census data, the relationship 
between factors appears to be quickly recognizable, and Jackson County appears to fit the norms as 
far as voting averages in the different internal influencing groups are concerned. However, it must be 
noted that this study ofinternal influencing factors in Jackson County is extremely limited and offers 
little beyond conjecture. It merely takes averages from census data and does not have any primary 
statistics to rely on as to who actually did physically vote in each judicial election. In order to study 
these factors in a more conclusive manoer which allows for correlations between the influencing 
factors and voter participation to be drawn correctly, data would have to be gathered as to the actual 
characteristics ofthose who did vote in the judicial elections selected for review. This is certainly not 
• possible for elections that have already occurred, but most certainly will be in the future. Specifically 
a actual survey of those who vote would have to be conducted as to the characteristics that one 
wishes to review of penple who are leaving a polliog station. Under these conditions, it may be 
possible to correctly identifY internal influencing fuctors in Illioois. Until then, research into these 
internal influencing factors should not be taken as accurate or significant. 
CONCLUSION OF STUDY IN JACKSON COUNTY 
A complete examination of voter and census data in Jackson County indicates that some 
factors may negatively or positively influence turnout and participation, as well as determine who will 
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be victorious in each election. It is possible to track external factors such as media coverage of the 
election to internal factors such as educational level, and when examined in Jackson County it appears 
• 
that some factors may influence the electorate more extensively than others. In the case ofexternal 
factors, it appears that voter turnout is more easily swayed by media coverage and the national 
importance ofother voting opportunities being conducted at the time of the election. In the case of 
internal factors, data to correctly examine the influence ofthese factors on voter participation is not 
readily available. Conclusions can only be drawn on averages, an extremely limited study. It must 
therefore be determined that internal influencing factors in Jackson County cannot be significantly 
determined with available data without drawing conclusions from insufficient data When trying to 
determinewhether participation is at high enough levels to justifYusing the electionmethod inJackson 
County alone, with a 41 percent voter turnout, it appears that without a majority vote, it is possible 
that it may not be an effective method. Probably at least a majority turnout of 50 percent or greater, 
that is halfof the potential electorate in the county, could possibly be considered enough. A turnout 
such as this may show that the election method of judicial selection is indeed based on popular 
election. Until then, people who argue democratic theory in support ofthe judicial selection method 
ofelection in place in Illinois will find no support in the data that I reviewed. 
CONCLUSION 
As previously noted, the United States Constitution extended powers to the Judiciary branch 
as the third and final branch in its creation ofa government. With the extension ofthese powers and 
the further extension offull faith and credit to each individual state in the country, the federaljudiciary 
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and the judiciary in each state has tremendous responsibilities. With each state making its own laws 
in relation to judicial selection within their state, concurrence at to the best method ofselection is not 
evidenced. There are many methods that have both been used and evolved over time. 
Each state in the country has a detailed history as to their choice ofjudicial selection method. 
These methods have evolved as the philosophies ofhow the country should be governed has changed, 
from the view that the state legislature is best qualified to select judges to the philosophy that 
government is strictly by consent, and that should include judges also. The selection method of 
election has been chosen in Illinois and has many supporters and also much opposition. It has not been 
without controversy that Illinois chose to adopt this method. It has also not been without controversy 
that Illinois chose to keep this method during its last constitutional convention and supporters ofboth 
methods continue to debate which system is best. 
• 
Looking at this issue on a local county leve~ one finds that participation in the election process 
is not necessarily representative of the people as declared by election method proponents. A further 
study into factors that influence voter participation may allow for some consideration of why the 
electorate choose not to vote, but many factors remain difficult to examine. One point may be certain, 
however, a system that relies on popular election cannot probably remain effective if voter 
participation continues to decline, the functionality of the system is most likely impaired. 
The method ofjudicial selection in each state is determined by the legislation of that state in 
their constitution. The different methods have evolved over history to present time, although the 
methods themselves have not changed, each methods popularity has. The system of election that 
Illinois has chosen has often been attacked by the reform movement, especially as the local electorate 
participates less and less, and political parties and affiJiated associations exert pressure for change and 
• -50­
• 
participate more. Many see national unification as the answer, which may be the case, as a unified 
system is less easily questioned than an individual one. What is certain, however, is that the debate 
will continue whichever system is chosen. 11lis debate should probably be driven by data and by 
objective standards as opposed to attachment to democratic principles. 
•
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APPENDIX A 
ruDICIAL RETENTION ELECTIONS 
JACKSON COUNTY, ILLINOIS 
YEAR JUDGE RETAIN JUDGE? 
YES NO 
% 
YES 
TOTAL VOTES 
CAST 
MEAN 
VOTER 
• 
1976 Clayton 11,547 3,497 77 
Kunce 12,843 4,349 77 
Lewis 11,652 3,356 78 
1978 Chase 6,170 2,692 70 
Oros 6,605 2,840 74 
1980 Goldenhersch 10,059 4,468 69 
Richman 11,175 5,384 68 
Howell 9,890 4,443 69 
1982 Lewis 9,146 3,307 73 
Bigler 8,503 3,610 70 
Green 9,465 3,612 78 
1984 Henshaw 11,754 4,662 72 
Williamson 11,858 4,564 72 
Spomer 11,635 4,841 71 
Oros 11,557 4,816 70 
Karns 11,889 5,161 70 
Jones 12,455 4,756 72 
1986 Richman * 6,995 5,795 55 
Howell 7,378 3,417 68 
Haney 7,673 3,080 71 
Howerton 7,810 2,922 72 
Lowery 7,277 3,088 70 
South X 6,791 4,944 58 
1988 Lewis 12,291 3,344 79 
Bigler 11,187 2,914 75 
* 
Barely received recommendation from Illinois Bar Association 
X Strongly Not Recommended by Illinois Bar Association 
All candidates received recommendation from the Southern Illinoisan 
15,041 
16,733 
15,008 
8,862 
8,905 
14,527 
16,559 
14,333 
12,553 
12,113 
12,077 
16,416 
16,422 
16,476 
16,473 
17,050 
17,211 
12,790 
10,795 
10,753 
10,732 
10,365 
11,735 
15,635 
15,001 
15,594 
8,884 
15,139 
12,247 
16,674 
11,195 
15,318 
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APPENDIXB 
1990 US CENSUS DATA 
Jackson County 
PERSONS 
Universe: Persons 
Total . 61,067 
HOUSEHOLDS 
Universe: Households 
Total . 23,491 
SEX 
Universe: Persons 
Male 
Female 
. 
. 
31,396 
29,671 
RACE 
Universe: Persons 
White . 
Black . 
American Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut . 
Asian or Pacific . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Other race . 
51,991 
6,342 
109 
2,178 
447 
AGE 
Universe: Persons 
Under 1 year 
1 and 2 years 
3 and 4 years 
5 years . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
6 years . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
7 to 9 years . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
10 and II years 
12 and 13 years . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . 
14 years . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
15 years . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
16 years . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
598 
1,409 
1,355 
692 
691 
2,048 
1,306 
1,210 
574 
552 
585 
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17 years . 580 
18 years . 1,890 
19 years . 3,168 
20 years . 3,244 
21 years . 3,151 
22 to 24 years . 5,822 
25 to 29 years . 5,409 
30 to 34 years . 4,409 
35 to 39 years . 3,870 
40 to 44 years . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,398
 
45 to 49 years . 2,559 
50 to 54 years . 2,051 
55 to 59 years . 1,913 
60 to 62 years . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 779
 
62 to 64 years . 1,229 
65 to 69 years . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,888
 
70 to 74 years . 1,637 
75 to 79 years . 1,432 
80 to 84 years . 912 
85 years and over . 706 
EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT 
• Universe: Persons 18 years and over Less than 9th grade .. . .. . .. .. .. .. .. . .. .. . 3,376 
9th to 12th grade, no diploma . . 4,420 
High school graduate (includes equivalency) . 9,604 
Some college, no degree . 16,959 
Associate degree . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 4,127 
Bachelor's degree . 6,415 
Graduate or professional degree . 4,566 
HOUSEHOLD INCOME IN 1989 
Universe: Households 
Less than $5,000 3,765 
$5,000 to $9,999 3,938 
$10,000 to $12,499 . 1,409 
$12,500 to $14,999 . 1,372 
$15,000 to $17,499 . 1,231 
$17,500 to $19,999 . 1,140 
$20,000 to $22,499 . 1,021 
$22,500 to $24,999 . 889 
• 
$25,000 to $27,499 . 987 
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$27,500 to $29,999 666
 
$30,000 to $32,499 840
 
$32,500 to $34,999 538
 
$35,000 to $37,499 650
 
$37,500 to $39,999 
$40,000 to $42,499 
$42,500 to $44,999 
$45,000 to $47,499 
$47,500 to $49,999 
$50,000 to $54,999 
$55,000 to $59,999 
$60,000 to $74,999 
$75,500 to $99,999 
$100,000 to $124,999 
$125,000 to $149,999 
$150,000 or more 
• 
444
 
474
 
381
 
430
 
430
 
559
 
453
 
958
 
531
 
157
 
106
 
122
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BAA OFFICIAL BALLOT· GENERAL ELECTION
 
JACKSON COUNTY,ILLINOIS· NOVEMBER 5. 1996
 l .....".." 
JACKSON COUNTY 
•
 
Shall the Property rax Extension Umitatlon Law (35 ILeS 200118-185 through 18-245), 
which limits annuaJ property tax extension increases, apply to non-home rule taXing 
districts with all or a portion of their equalized assessed valuation located in the County SPECIMEN SAl 
of Jackson? 
GENERAL ELE( 
YES 140~ 
NO 141~ 
JACKSON COUNTY, ILLII 
ELECTION TUESDAY, NOVEM8 
~~' c:::: 
I HEREBY CERTIFY THE FOREGOING SPECIMENT BALL{ 
OFFICIAL BALLOT TO BE useD IN THE GENERAL E 
JACKSON COUNTY. ILLINOIS. TUESOAY, NOVEMBER 5, 1 
•
 
'AA OFAC1AL BALLOT· GENERAL ELECTION 
JACKSON CQUNTY,lLUN01S - NOVEMBER 5. 1996 
BALLOT FOR JUDICIAL CANDIDATES
 
SEEKING RETENTION IN OFFICE
 
VOTE ONTHE PROPOSmONWITH RESPECTTO AU OR ANY OFTHE JUDGES USTED 
)N THIS BAllOT. NO JUDGE LISTED IS RUNNING AGJI.INST ANY OTHER JUDGE. THE 
;OLE auESTlON IS WHETHER EACH JUDGE SHALL BE RETAINED IN HIS PRESENT 
)FACE." 
CIRCUIT COURT JUOCiE 
,HALL GEORGE OROS be retalnedl" office lit Juooe OF THE 
:rRCUIT COURT FIRST JUDICIAL CIRCV\T1 
'HAlL MICHAEL J. HENSHAW be__ " _ .. 
UDGE OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FIRST JUDICtAl CIRCum 
'HALL JAMES R. WILLIAMSON be .,..... ,,_.. 
UOGE OF TIiE CIRCUIT ~RT FIRST JUDICIAL CIRcum 
;HAlL STEPHEN L SPOMER be rfltalned In alb;lS JUDGe 
)F THE CIRCUIT COURT FIRST JUDICiAl CIRCUIT? 
;HAl.L PAUL $. MURPHY be rfllU!ed lnotTlce •• JUDl)E OF 
'HE ClRCUITCOURT FIRST JUOIC!AL CIRCUIT? 
YES 122-+ 
NO 123-+ 
YES 124-+ 
NO 125-+ 
YES 126-+ 
NO 127-+ 
YES 12B-+ 
NO 129-+ 
YES 130-+ 
NO 131-+ 
~
 
h 
• 
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